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INTRODUCTION 
In June 2009, an Air France Airbus flight 447 crashed in the Atlantic Ocean en route from 
Rio de Janeiro to Paris. All 216 passengers and 12 crew members were killed, making it the 
worst accident in the history of French aviation. The final report of the crash investigation 
(AF 2012) listed a number of mingled factors. Apparently ice formed inside the small ‘pitot 
tubes’ on the plane’s underside, interfering with the airspeed sensors. These caused the 
autopilot to disconnect, and the (human) pilots assumed manual control of the aircraft. Over 
the next three minutes, the pilot increased and then levelled the plane’s nose-up pitch in 
response to a series of inconsistent air speed readings and intermittent stall warnings being 
received. However the flight path had become ‘destabilised’, leading to a stall and rapid 
descent. In the final report, the pilot’s actions were described as ‘inappropriate control inputs’ 
(AF 2012), but this was only one dimension in an interwoven assemblage of technological, 
material, and human forces that together resulted in a horrific crash. Nonetheless, aviation 
experts interviewed in an analysis of these events placed the central accountability on human 
error: the key problem, they stressed, was inadequate pilot competency on manual landings, 
and inadequate pilot training (BBC 2012). 
 
This is not an uncommon response, particularly in linking professional responsibility with 
competency and with learning. Professionals are often held personally accountable for 
complex situations involving myriad elements that are fully entangled with – influencing as 
well as influenced by - human decisions and actions.  Sometimes this is called scapegoating, 
as when a particularly visible actor attracts the full measure of societal wrath and guilt in an 
inexplicable situation. We see examples of this periodically in child protection services: a 
recent well known case in the UK was the sacking of ex-children services director Sharon 
Shoesmith in the case of Baby Peter Connolly, a child who died in 2007 with over 50 injuries 
despite 60 visits by social services professional (Butler 2011). But more broadly, 
professionals in services ranging from social care, education, and police services to medicine 
and aviation are expected to mediate the increasing general anxiety of a complex society. 
Whether or not we agree with Beck’s (1992) analysis of our ‘risk culture’ increasingly 
characterised by a ‘negative logic’ framing risk as danger and seeking to identify who has 
done the wrong thing, arguably a key expectation for professionals is to manage our societal 
risk and solve complex problems. Calls for professional responsibility often are based on 
assumptions that problems have identifiable causes, that humans can take decisions to resolve 
them, and that there are clear imputabilities when bad things happen.  
 
This may be why professional responsibility has traditionally been treated as a defining site 
for the nature of professionalism itself, invoking an ideology of professionals’ obligations to 
both the client’s interests as well as the needs of society broadly. The existing literature on 
professional responsibility is characterised by much moral prescription, opinion, and concern 
for methods to educate professionals to perform more responsibly. These circulate amidst 
complaints and public concern regarding professionals’ perceived irresponsible practice and 
failure to appropriately regulate responsibility. Professional education and training are 
frequently invoked as key sites for developing professional responsibility. Solbrekke 
(2008a:77) is among those who argue that higher education – and society in general – must 
explicitly educate professional responsibility, to ‘ensure that we have qualified professionals 
with the kind of intellectual and cultural capital necessary to make wise decisions in light of 
the challenges of the 21st century’. 
 
But does this emphasis on individuals and individual decisions really help to understand, 
account for and respond to the complex situations in which professionals must act everyday? 
Perhaps it is more comforting to focus on human skill and imagine that this can be resolved 
through training and discipline, rather than attempt to consider how responsibility might be 
distributed among the heterogeneous entanglement of Airbus designers, autopilot practices, 
pitot tubes, ice, sensor readings, human adjustments and volatile airspeeds. Surely these 
material and technological assemblings cannot be simply banished to the background in an 
anthropocentric move that insists upon humans taking the central role of the story, whether it 
focuses on risk and danger or upon more mundane service and care. Literature on professional 
practice increasingly shows that its stakeholders are multiple, demanding conflicting 
accountabilities (Cribb 2005; Stronach et al 2002). Clearly these are not simply human and 
social stakeholders, but material ones too. 
 
This chapter argues that professional responsibility deserves a more sociomaterial sensibility 
than it frequently receives in discussions of professional learning and professional 
accountability. A missing or obscured element in these explorations is often the materiality of 
professional practice – the mixing of the social and personal with the material elements of 
bodies and flesh, wind and fire, objects, technologies, texts, institutions, natural forces and so 
forth. A ‘sociomaterial’ approach to understanding professional responsibility adopts what 
some refer to as a relational ontology: capacities for action, as well as knowledge and 
phenomena, are performed into existence through associations. These associations of both 
human and nonhuman elements, or perhaps more aptly, ‘intensities’ as Bennett (2010) refers 
to them following Deleuze, emerge in precarious assemblages (Fenwick et al. 2011). When 
notions such as individual agency, morality and intentionality are challenged by 
foregrounding these sociomaterial assemblages comprising practice, the question of 
responsibility becomes reconfigured. The focus becomes the material enactments of conflict 
and compromise that appear in enactments of professional responsibility. 
 
The chapter begins with a discussion of the changing nature of professional responsibility, 
and elaborates a sociomaterial perspective that draws particularly from Latour (2005) and 
Orlikowski (2007). Turning to examples of professional practice generated through recent 
studies, the discussion works with a sociomaterial sensibility to explore those mattering 
elements that are more-than-human. What responsibilities are enacted in these sociomaterial 
assemblages, and how are accountabilities framed? How do professionals negotiate the 
ambivalences of these complex becomings to find lines of whatever they might call 
‘responsible’ action? What matters most to professionals in these ‘mattered’ enactments of 
responsibility?  
 
TOWARD A SOCIOMATERIAL CONCEPTION OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Solbrekke (2008a: 76) argues for the centrality of professional responsibility in practice 
defined as ‘the ability to act in a professionally responsible manner in complex, unique and 
uncertain situations with conflicting values and ethical stance’. She goes on to explain the 
nature of this action amidst the frequent undecidability of practice: ‘the individual 
professional, when encountering risk and uncertainty in his or her daily tasks, must employ 
his or her own capacity for critical reflection and take immediate moral and responsible 
decisions while at the same time linking his or her personal specialised knowledge to a 
collective commitment’ (p. 76). Many professionals might agree that responsibility is an 
individual matter of decision making informed by particular moral commitments and 
knowledge expertise. 
 
Yet, as Solbrekke also has acknowledged, there is growing research pointing to the pluralism 
of professionals’ obligations and the conflicts in responsibility that individuals must 
negotiate. Professionals must balance obligations to their employing organization and its rules 
of practice, to broad social needs served by their profession, to the profession itself and the 
standards and regulatory codes governing its practices, to individuals for whom the 
professional adopts a caring responsibility, and to personal allegiances influencing a sense of 
the ‘right thing to do’. This ‘web of commitments’ often necessitates what May (1996) has 
called ‘legitimate compromises’. Practitioners almost always must navigate a path of action 
that simultaneously balances concerns for different stakeholders without necessarily meeting 
the full expectations of any one. For example, Solbrekke (2008b) shows that while 
practitioners in law and psychology continually must negotiate difficult compromises, they 
appear overly governed by externally defined regulations.  
 
Professionals’ negotiations of these conflicting responsibilities are becoming exacerbated by 
particular conflicts between the claims of increased efficiency and economy and the best 
interests of clients, students and patients (Colley et al. 2007; Robinson 2009; Stronach et al. 
2002). Stronach and his colleagues report that nurses and teachers appear to manage this 
particular conflict by simultaneously juggling conflicting discourses of professionalism in 
their everyday work: an economy of performance, and an ecology of practice. Colley et al., 
drawing from Cribb (2005), describe this work as ethical labour: practitioners not only are 
tasked to difficult work in managing these ethical conflicts, but find their ethical work itself 
commodified. While professionals are often depicted as continually ‘becoming’, in practice 
they must often choose to act in ways ‘unbecoming’, such as when they feel compelled by 
professional responsibilities of care and compassion for an individual patient or student to 
work around or subvert more general regulations oriented to certain performance outcomes. 
 
More broadly, some have signaled a demand for new forms of professionalism in these 
conflicts. For instance Noordegraf (2011) argues for an ‘organised professionalism’ that 
recognises the ways that changing circumstances are requiring organisationally-based 
capacities for responsibility. He identifies three changes that are requiring a more systemic 
approach to professionalism and responsibility: (a) professionals are increasingly seeking 
organized work conditions; (b) they face new ambiguously bounded cases that call for well-
organized multi-professional acts; and (c) these cases present new critical risks, that are better 
managed through an organised response. Collaborative multi-agency practice is becoming a 
more typical response to such complex and boundary-blurred cases, but raises new issues of 
responsibility. Different positionings of professionals invoke different ethical sensibilities as 
well as focus and scope for responsible practice, argues Cribb (2005). Doctors focus on 
curing, nurses on caring, or at least that is the myth promoted by some clinicians. But beyond 
the ways that practitioners position (or accuse) each other, it is clear that different groups are 
fundamentally enmeshed in their own epistemic communities. Particularly in synchronistic 
situations such as in multi-professional team work, researchers continue to show that each 
professional group’s knowledge and sense of what is most important or what is the right thing 
to do is oriented around a distinct history of practice that is tightly woven to particular 
instruments and tools, language and commitments.  Edwards (2007:2) has shown that what is 
called for in such situations is ‘relational agency’, which involves distributed expertise and 
mutual responsibility, as well as mutual attunement and adjustment to others’ worlds of 
practice: ‘a capacity to align one’s thoughts and actions with those of others to interpret 
aspects of one’s world and to act on and respond to those interpretations’. Working from 
activity theory, Edwards stresses that artefacts as well as people and activity are critical in 
mediating practice, knowing, and responsibility. 
 
All of this speaks to a more systemic, relational and material approach to understanding 
professionalism and ‘professional responsibility’. Yet like professional learning, professional 
responsibility has long been understood as a personal, and sometimes social, phenomenon. As 
Solbrekke and Sugrue (2010) show, professional responsibility is mostly treated as a matter of 
individual ethical decision making, informed by professional knowing of particular values 
and commitments that can be inculcated through education and ethical codes. A sociomaterial 
approach offers a different configuration for rethinking professional responsibility, where the 
material and the social are viewed as mutually implicated in bringing forth the world. As the 
introduction to this volume argues, professional practice weaves together knowing with 
action, conversation, affect, and materials in purposeful and regularized orderings of human 
activity. Material forces– flesh and blood, forms and checklists, diagnostic machines and 
databases, furniture and passcodes, snowstorms and dead cell zones  – are integral in shaping 
professional practice both as a repertoire of routines as well in particular moments of response 
and decision. Yet materiality is often dismissed or ignored in analyses of professional 
responsibility.  
 
The central premise of sociomateriality adopted in this argument is, as Orlikowski (2007: 
1435) puts it, ‘the constitutive entanglement of the social and material in everyday life’. All 
things – human and non-human, hybrids and parts, knowledge and systems – are understood 
to be  effects of connections and activity. They are performed into existence in webs of 
relations. There are no received categories. The point is that material things are performative 
and not inert; they are matter and they matter. They act together with other types of things and 
forces to exclude, invite, and regulate particular forms of participation in enactments, some of 
which we term knowing. The move here is what Jensen (2010:7) characterises as ‘from 
epistemology and representation to practical ontology and performativity’. The question of 
producing knowledge and learning shifts from a representational idiom, mapping and 
understanding a world that is out there, to a view that the world is doing things, full of 
agency. When we accept such a configuration, processes such as acting, learning and 
responding are understood to be sociomaterial enactments. A focus on the socio-material 
therefore helps us to untangle the heterogeneous relationships holding together these larger 
categories, tracing their durability as well as their weaknesses. From this approach, no 
anterior distinctions, such as human beings or social structures, are presupposed. Everything 
is performed into existence: ‘the agents, their dimensions and what they are and do, all 
depend on the morphology of the relations in which they are involved’ (Callon, 1991). 
 
Particularly for purposes of examining professional responsibility, one key contribution of 
sociomaterial analysis is to de-couple knowing and action from a strictly human-centered 
socio-cultural ontology, and to liberate agency and responsibility from its conceptual confines 
as a human-generated force. Instead, agency is understood to be enacted in the emergence and 
interactions – as well as the exclusionings - occurring in the smallest encounters. Bennett 
(2010:1) describes this as the ‘force of things’, ‘the agency of assemblages’ and ‘the vitality 
of materiality’, drawing from Deleuzian discussions of vital materialism of energies coursing 
through matter. Her argument focuses on why materiality is critical to reformulating a politics 
and responsibility that moves beyond oppositions, blame and self interest. She shows how 
public life is dramatically acted upon by matter, such as food and fat, stem cells, metal and 
electricity. The North American electricity blackout of 2003 that affected 50 million people, 
for example, was enacted through a heterogeneous assemblage including electricity, power 
plants (with overprotective mechanisms and understaffing), transmission wires (with limits on 
their heat capacity), a regulatory commission and policy act (that privatized electricity and 
separated transmission of electricity from distribution), energy-trading corporations (profiting 
from the grid at the expense of maintaining infrastructure), consumers (with growing demand 
for electricity), and a brush fire in Ohio. The point is not that individual objects have agency, 
but that force is exercised through these sociomaterial assemblages. Non-human materiality, 
Bennett argues, is interpenetrated with human intensities in these assemblages in ways that 
must be treated symmetrically. Human responsibility, then, is the effect of particular 
distributions and accumulations enacted through such assemblages. This view 
 
multiplies the potentially relevant actors and force attention on their differences and 
relations. The aspiration is to thereby facilitate more nuanced analyses of how humans and 
things (broadly construed) together create, stabilize and change worlds. Analyses, in other 
words, that are sensitive to human and nonhuman activities as practical ontology: efforts to 
concretely shape and interrelate the components that make up the worlds they inhabit.  
(Jensen, 2010: 5) 
 
Capacity for action is relational, and distributed among the elements of these entangled assemblages. 
All things are continually acting with one another, not as separate entities but as overlapping waves 
that are intra-active (rather than inter-acting, which implies separate things that come together). 
Barad (2003: 817) argues that the sociomaterial real becomes performed into existence through 
specific intra-actions that she calls ‘agential cuts’ in ‘the ongoing open process of mattering’. 
Through these agential cuts, matter becomes separated into distinct entities, allowing us to see 
boundaries and relationships among knower, known and knowledge. Agency is not confined to 
humans or human-associated desires and energies. Instead, agency emerges through the dynamic 
openness of each intra-action, which enable iterative changes. Thus for Barad (2003: 823), ‘matter 
comes to matter through the iterative intra-activity of the world in its becoming’. Following a similar 
line of analysis, educational philosopher Bai (2001: 26) writes, ‘changes are the result of our 
interpenetrating the world’, more than of human conscious intentional action to do something. 
 
These notions of ‘intra-active’ assemblages of human and nonhuman, ‘vital materialities’ and 
human action as ‘interpenetration’ in the living matter and technologically mediated worlds of 
everyday professional practice hold profound transformative potential for many social 
sciences and humanities. As Braidotti (2013) argues passionately, they open an expanded, 
radical relational conception of subjectivity, a transversal and ecological posthumanism. 
While this conception has profound ethical and political commitments, following Braidotti’s 
arguments (as well as Barad’s, where an ethical feminist project is central) it provoke serious 
challenges to classical notions of individual agency, morality and intentionality that asre 
usually central to thinking about professional responsibility. Difficult questions arise, 
particularly in considering professional responsibility - the tip at which converges public trust, 
societal anxiety, and regulatory scrutiny. Who and what is responsible in difficult encounters 
when capacities for action are distributed, when action and subjectivities are emergent? 
Where are the points of accountability? How can professionals negotiate these ambivalent 
encounters? 
 
DILEMMAS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE POLITICS OF 
MATERIALS AND PRACTICE 
 To begin to explore these questions, let us turn to some specific examples of dilemmas in 
professional practice, and try a sociomaterial reading to problematics of responsibility that 
arise. In this short chapter little more can be done than to offer a brief taste of what a more-
than-human perspective might offer when considering professonals’ everyday practices. Two 
small scenarios will be shared, drawn from different studies of professionals at work. The first 
study focused on interprofessional practice in the situations of emergency mental health care. 
The second examined issues of co-production (community involvement in generating 
solutions and developing needed services) in rural policing.  
 
Inter-professional practice, as was described earlier, often involves a collision of different 
practices, terminology, instruments, and forms of knowledge. Emergency mental health care 
is one example. An emergency call for events can range from attempted self-harm to 
psychotic or aggressive episodes related to a mental health disorder. It typically involves 
paramedics, police, and hospital-based health professionals. As we found in a recent study 
that interviewed these different personnel, emergency mental health care often presents 
ambivalent situations across a vast range of diverse conditions (Aberton & Slade 2012, 
Essington 2011). There are no standardised procedures or specified ‘care pathways’ for these 
emergencies, and little training. Yet there are clear duties of responsibility in each of the 
professions involved, although these do not map easily onto the situations that emerge or 
mesh together smoothly. For instance, while the police duty of care is to promote security and 
safety of all persons involved in an incident, for Scottish ambulance practitioners their duty of 
responsibility is to care for and deliver the patient to a safe place (with minor variations 
depending on job classification). This concept of ‘safety’, a core principle for both groups, 
can be enacted very differently in their own worlds of practice. In one case recounted in our 
study, where a man was threatening to jump off a bridge onto a motorway, the police 
explained that ‘we grabbed him by the shoulder … [and he] was put in handcuffs for his own 
safety … and put in the back of the police vehicle … until he calmed down’, and ‘it took three 
of us to kind of hold him down … just trying to calm him down’. Grabbing, handcuffing, and 
holding down constitute a particular enactment of safety and response to a distressed man, 
which cannot be separated from the intermeshed actions of all present. 
 
The apparatus of each group also clearly distinguishes two different material worlds of 
practice, organised around different purposes and practices: the ambulance outfitted with 
medical equipment, assessment devices and cots for emergency clinical diagnosis and care, 
and the police van that may be equipped with emergency shields, handcuffs, and possibly 
firearms. Ambulance practitioners are not able to restrain a patient, but police have the power 
to exercise involuntary detention of a mental health patient in an emergency. Meanwhile 
hospital staff, who typically refer to paramedics’ work as ‘pre-hospital care’, tend to view the 
hospital activity as the site where the most reliable and robust treatment occurs. Everything 
else, from this perspective, ought inevitably to flow to the hospital. To ‘join up’ the different 
worlds of practice involved in a single emergency call, practitioners must rely on professional 
judgment, improvisation, close attunement to the others involved and their traditions and 
limits of practice, and a personal sense of the ‘responsible’ thing to do.   
 
Another example from this study (Aberton & Slade 2012) illustrates the different material 
worlds at play, as well as the ways that transitions among them must be achieved. A patient, 
reportedly in a schizophrenic condition, was balancing on a window ledge two floors up. 
Paramedic Kaitlyn was called to the scene:  
[She] hadn’t been taking medication and stuff for a matter of weeks, and was basically 
balancing on a window ledge, and it was her heels that were kinda more or less holding 
her on. But she was hallucinating at the same time, and she could hear people in the 
garden telling her to come, come to her, come, come to them, to basically jump. And 
obviously there was me and a policewoman. … If you engaged enough with her then 
she would keep speaking to you, but I think as soon as somebody was not speaking or 
she wasn’t, didn’t want to speak to you anymore then it was obviously the hallucination 
or the voices that she was hearing. And there was a few occasions that I thought she was 
gonna go …. but we managed to get her back in,[with a cigarette because we learned 
from the other people in the house that she was a smoker] and the policewoman was 
saying to her that she could go in the ambulance and that. But due to the circumstances 
of the actual job, the ambulance has a side door and the two back doors, and obviously 
… in the back of the ambulance, you’ve got different things…. And the way that she, 
that she was I, I didn’t feel it was safe for the patient to be in the back of an ambulance’ 
(Kaitlyn pp. 16-17). 
 
An assemblage of heterogeneous elements interact in the emergency. The patient’s 
heels, voices, hallucinations, window ledge, the mental state of the patient, broken glass 
door, absence of usual medication, paramedics, a policewoman, a cigarette, trust, 
ambulance doors and equipment in the back and police van. The job of the paramedics 
and police is to relocate the patient to ‘a place of safety’. On closer examination of the 
data the movement between different related entities can be identified for the sake of 
description as four enactments which merge and emerge. First, ‘If you engaged enough 
with the patient she would keep speaking to you’. The voice of the paramedic effected 
temporary disengagement from the seductive voices in the garden. The patient’s 
attention could be diverted from the seductive voices below which were inviting her to 
jump. Second, the urge to smoke and the enticement of a cigarette precipitated this 
transition from the window ledge to ‘safety’ inside the house. Third was the transition 
to hospital in a police car, which was deemed ‘safer’ than the ambulance with its doors 
and equipment, but risked a new transition in patient behavior after the promise of an 
ambulance. (adapted from Aberton & Slade 2012, 3-4) 
 
This scenario illustrates how enactments of professional responsibilities for care and safety 
are the effect of relations between assemblages of heterogeneous elements. Responsibility is 
distributed – not just across different professionals each making or deferring decisions, but 
also across and through the different materials engaged the various events. Elements and 
humans are not distinct and separate, but act on each other, respond to and overlap with each 
other. Responsibility lies more in individuals’ attunement to these different relations, and 
their intra-engagement with the networks of action that produce difficult encounters, than 
with any one professional’s choice of action. 
 
Co-production is another area that illustrates the difficulty of drawing tight lines of 
professional responsibility in providing public services. Fast becoming a dominant policy 
discourse in the UK, Australia and North America, ‘co-production’ can be defined as 
professional services and products that are co-developed with clients or service users. In 
public sector services such as health, policing and social care, co-production increasingly 
calls for active community participation whereby service users are centrally involved in 
planning and designing as well as delivering services. Boyle and Harris (2009:12) explain that 
it ‘goes well beyond the idea of ‘citizen engagement’ or ‘service user involvement’ to foster 
the principle of ‘equal partnership’. But critical questions about co-production touch issues of 
responsibility. To what extent, in various cases, are users and families even interested in such 
‘partnerships’? How are they trained and compensated for taking on these responsibilities? 
And where does accountability fall when things go wrong?  
 
These questions are related to processes of negotiating decision-making, authority and 
expectations in co-produced public service. In a recent study of co-production in policing, we 
examined these everyday negotiations (Fenwick 2012). The context was a large rural area 
policed by one constabulary, where practice often had to be conducted from single-officer 
stations responsible for covering dozens of square miles characterized by significant 
geographical challenges (mountains, lengthy coastline, and many islands). Experienced 
officers learned a variety of work-arounds to stretch resources and to ‘play the long game’ in 
everyday moments, as one sergeant put it. Rather than leaping to action by following 
prescribed protocol strictly, they often negotiate to sustain a longer trusting relationship. This 
negotiation has practical material ends as well as social ones, for much investigative police 
work in the community relies on information that one’s neighbours are willing to share freely. 
 
‘It's a minor road traffic infringement and you can use your discretion and say “OK 
Mike, next time put your seatbelt on or get that light fixed” rather than booking him or 
giving him a ticket, because tomorrow that person could be a key-witness in something 
more serious and if you’ve got their backs up they're no[t] going to come you with the 
information.’ (constable, town in northern Scotland) 
 
The importance of materiality continually emerges in these narratives of negotiations. In one 
incident, a constable was called to a hit-and-run scene, where a lorry allegedly had backed 
into a shopkeeper’s wall. Recognizing some metallic blue paint shavings left on this wall, the 
officer scraped them into an envelope and drove round to see the fellow he believed they 
belonged to. After some conversation seeking the man’s assistance, the paint shavings were 
produced, inducing his sudden recollection of ‘oh, that wall!’, and his promise to pop round 
and fix the wall that afternoon. According to the officer, even the shop owner was satisfied 
because his wall got fixed so quickly. The entire incident was contained as an issue of some 
material damage needing repair, inflicted by a truck. It was neither personalized as an 
escalated case of injury and defense, nor labeled, disciplined and recorded as a crime. The 
community members involved worked with the police officer to co-produce this construction 
of the incident, stepping away from the conflict script of defensive perpetrator/outraged 
victim and taking up positions of cooperation. 
 
The situation becomes complicated where lives are at risk. One man, now an inspector and 
instructor, told stories of his first postings in communities on the long undefended coastline of 
northwest Scotland. Here as a single officer, he and colleagues typically improvised a range 
of material and social resources to manage issues ranging from attempted drug smuggling to 
air-sea emergency rescues. In one story, he tells of being called to a scene of alleged assault. 
Arriving to confront a very large and physically aggressive intoxicated man, the lone officer 
engaged a nearby fisherman to help wrestle him to the ground, using the fisherman’s ropes to 
secure him. Naturally, the interviewee noted, this wasn’t recognized standard procedure but 
safety for all sometimes requires improvisation. Another described being a single officer 
called to a major motorway vehicular crash. To secure the scene for investigation, obtain 
emergency help for the injured, and ensure the safety of oncoming traffic, he needed to 
mobilize any tools to hand and anyone who stopped to help – while managing his own 
emotions and those of all involved.  
 
Overall, these instances indicate a little of the intensive dialogue, negotiation and consultation 
that Needham (2007) emphasizes to be critical elements in co-production. They show, 
however, that responsibility is a complex activity that transcends conversation and social 
relations – it is also embodied, and invokes materiality in ways that skilled practitioners can 
leverage. Many opportune moments for negotiating responsibility were not planned, but 
seemed to emerge within encounters involving a range of sociomaterial entanglements. 
Resourceful officers found ways to work effectively within and through these assemblages to 
interrupt, reframe, and avert problem situations in moments that may be best characterized as 
knowing-in-practice. ‘Responsible’ action emerges in the sociomaterial mix, in being attuned 
to possibilities available in this mix at any moment, and in being sufficiently resourceful to 
improvise with these possibilities. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In situations calling for responsible decision-making, professionals must balance competing 
versions of the ‘good’ in highly uncertain encounters. They are called to act in what Caputo 
(1993) describes as ‘disasters’ where response ‘can occur only as a leap into an abyss, a 
plunge into the density and impenetrability of the event, the novelty and the surprise of 
singularity’ (1993:92, 97).  Professionals’ action in this leap rarely reflects a considered 
rational application of moral principles to a problem. Instead, decisions emerge through 
enactments in which a range of material as well as sociocultural phenomena and knowledge 
resources are entangled with practitioners.  
 
Following Barad’s (2003) conception of sociomaterial intra-activity, the issue in considering 
professional responsibility may be approached as understanding how professionals delineate 
their intra-actions within these sociomaterial assemblages. They do not act morally on an 
already existing real, but come into existence themselves within activity that materialises the 
moral. That is, professionals select actions – they perform agential cuts that help shape and 
redirect the real - but this process can only be enacted through particular material possibilities, 
forces and other capacities producing assemblages of practice. In the examples here of police 
and paramedic practices, we can see how professionals learn how to work with and through 
these entangled vitalities where human and material elements are almost inseparable in their 
continual overlapping and intra-acting, constituting professionals’ world of practices as well 
as the immediate encounter demanding action. They leverage the forces that they can, while 
holding open the tensions of competing goods. This sociomaterial juggling suggests a 
conception of professional responsibility that decentres the individual and materialises the 
moral, but without flattening or erasing the importance of human choice and ethical 
commitments in professional action.  
 
Two questions were posed at the beginning of this chapter: Who and what is responsible in 
difficult encounters when capacities for action are distributed, when action and subjectivities 
are emergent? Where are the points of accountability? This sociomaterial view begins by 
making visible the capillaries of action, the networks of Latour’s conception (2005), through 
which the multifarious associations comprising professional practice and its various 
responsibilities are produced. Paraphrasing Latour (2005: 44) we can state that any practice, 
encounter or decision is a knot or conglomerate of many material and human forces. These 
associations are ‘knotted’ and sustained through co-ordinations of human and non-human 
mediators such as plans and contracts, assessment sheets and report forms, handcuffs and 
paint scrapings. Such an analysis focuses attention not on who is responsible, but how 
responsibility is enacted – and often enacted differently – at different points among these 
associations. Further, it examines how particular accounts of responsibility are produced. 
How, for instance, are particular locations for professional responsibility in any given 
encounter achieved and stabilized? How do human beings and their competency become the 
centre of an accountable order, and how is this reproduced and disciplined? How does a 
particular person become the lightning rod for accountability, as in scapegoating of 
professional individuals, in complex cases that clearly are composed of myriad contributing 
factors? A sociomaterial analysis not only can help to unpick the assembling processes and 
the continuing work that produces practice and responsibility in particular ways, it can also 
make visible the ways in which we account for (ir)responsibility.   
 
The third question raised at the chapter’s beginning was, How can professionals negotiate 
these ambivalent encounters? The argument suggests that the way forward lies in an 
extraordinary attunement to all aspects of a case, not just the human or social elements that 
are most readily identifiable. There is a mindfulness required here, an ethical consideration 
extended to things. This is about an appreciation not only of the multiple human stakeholders 
in any case, but also of the complex associations of materials and people, equipment and 
emotions, technologies and desires. 
 
This is a view that moves far beyond a focus on individual professionals’ ethical decision 
making to an appreciation of how these decisions are entangled in networks of things that 
each have their own trajectory. Rather than attempting to dismiss or ignore these 
entanglements, or to control them through protocols of practice and ethical codes, a 
sociomaterial view recognises the vital intensities produced within this emergence, and opens 
new ways to think about professional practice and responsibility. Because in this view, as 
Barad (2003) argues, (unknown) radical future possibilities are available at every encounter. 
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